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COMMENTS
EDELMAN AND SCHEUER: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
While the language of the Eleventh Amendment may be abso-
lute on its face, it has, nevertheless, been subjected to inconsistent
interpretation by the Supreme Court.' Recently, the Court deliv-
ered two opinions, Edelman v. Jordan, and Scheuer v. Rhodes,3
which dealt with Eleventh Amendment problems. The purpose of
this article is to examine Edelman's effect upon the concept of
implied waiver by a state of its Eleventh Amendment protection,
to assess its holding as to when a suit against a state officer is
barred, and in conjunction with Scheuer examine the permissible
remedies against such state officers. In addition, Scheuer's holding
on executive immunity will be discussed. The relationship of these
two cases and the possible future problems presented by these cases
will also be discussed.
In Edelman,' the respondent brought a class action against
certain Illinois officials who were charged with the administration
of a joint state-federal assistance program. The suit sought decla-
ratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. section 19831 for their
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."
The Amendment was proposed and passed to counter the decision of Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 16 (1793). See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and
Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207 (1968); C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, ch. 3 (1972).
The Amendment has been interpreted to bar suits against states in federal court by
citizens of the state, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); it has also been held to bar suits
initiated by foreign governments, Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883), the Court held that the Amendment could
not be circumvented by having a state sue another state on the claim of one of its citizens;
however, the Amendment is not a bar to suits against the states initiated by the Federal
government, U.S. v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
2. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
3. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
4. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
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failure to process benefit claims under Aid to Aged, Blind and
Disabled (AABD) within federal time limits. The district court
granted a permanent injunction requiring the officials to comply
with the federal time limits, and ordered them to make retroactive
payments for the benefits wrongfully withheld. 7 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the retroactive payments were
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.9
Less than one month after Edelman, the Court announced its
decision in Scheuer. Scheuer was brought by the personal repre-
sentatives of students who were killed by National Guard troops,
called out to quell a disturbance at Kent State University. The
estates sought damages, again under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, from
the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the Ohio Guard,
the president of the university, and various guardsmen. 10 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, without answer, upon an affi-
davit of the defendants that they were being sued in their official
capacity and that the action was in effect against the State and thus
barred by the Eleventh Amendment." The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
adding an alternative ground for dismissal: the defendants were
protected by an absolute bar of common law executive immunity.12
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district
court had jurisdiction to hear the case, and that executive immun-
ity was not absolute. 3
II. IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
One judicially created exception to the language of the Eleventh
Amendment is the doctrine of waiver. While the Amendment poses
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to'be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress.
6. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85; effective January 1, 1974. AABD has been
replaced by a similar program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-805 (1973 Supp.).
7. 415 U.S. at 656.
8. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), revd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
9. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
10. 416 U.S. at 234.
11. Id. at 235-6.
12. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
13. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
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a jurisdictional bar14 to a suit against a state in federal court, it has
been recognized that this protection may be waived. 15 In Clark v.
Barnard6 the Court explicitly recognized that a state waives its
Eleventh Amendment protection when it intervenes in a suit as
party plaintiff. However, the Court has held that express waiver
by a state which would make it a party defendant must be found
in an appropriate statute or constitutional provision,r, and that
such language will be narrowly construed."8
The concept of implied waiver of Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion was explicitly recognized in the case of Parden v. Terminal R.
Co., 9 relied upon as authority in the Seventh Circuit's considera-
tion of Edelman.21 In Parden certain Alabama citizens sued a state
owned common carrier, in federal court, for personal injuries
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) .21 While the
Act granted concurrent jurisdiction to both state and federal
courts,2 the State objected to the suit on the grounds that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the litigation in federal court.? The
Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, held that Alabama waived
its Eleventh Amendment protection by implication when it began
operating a railroad subject to the FELA.24
After the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Edelman, but prior to the
Supreme Court's consideration of the case, Parden was modified
by the Court in Employees v. Department of Public Health and
14. 415 U.S. at 677-8. The Court said:
It has been well settled since the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Department oj
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently
partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial
court.
See Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower Court Interpretations and
the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473, 1480-2 (1973).
15. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184
(1964); A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 14, at 1493-8.
16. 108 U.S. 436 (1883). Clark was subsequently modified by Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U.S. 18 (1933), which allowed states to intervene for limited purposes without waiving the
Amendment's protection.
17. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
18. Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
19. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
20. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
21. Federal Employers Liability Act (Railroads) 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
22. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970).
23. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. 377 U.S. 184, 185 (1964).
24. 377 U.S. at 192. The Court said:
Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate
railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented
to such suit as was authorized by that act.
19751
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Welfare.2 In that case, workers at a Missouri state hospital sued
the State's Department of Public Health and Welfare in federal
court for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 6 The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action, holding that Missouri had not waived its Eleventh Amend-
ment protection.27 The majority opinion professed an inability to
find any congressional intent to subject the states to litigation in
Federal court as a result of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA.2 8
The Court also distinguished Parden on the ground that it involved
a profit making activity, as opposed to the nonproprietary function
of maintaining a hospital in Employees .2 Although these distinc-
tions have been criticized, 3 Employees indicates that mere partici-
pation by a state in a federally regulated area is insufficient as an
implied waiver.3' The case also strongly suggests that a state does
not waive the Amendment's protection unless there is a specific
grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in federal legislation to which
the states are subject. 2
Implied waiver was one of the grounds used by the Seventh
Circuit in upholding the award of retroactive benefits in Edelman.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Illinois had waived the
Amendment's protection by its participation in the AABD pro-
gram.33 The Supreme Court rejected the implied waiver concept
25. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
26. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
27. 411 U.S. at 285.
28. Id. This conclusion is entirely unsatisfactory. The 1966 Amendments to the Act
specifically included states within the definition of "Employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(D) (1970).
It makes little sense to subject the states to the provisions of the Act on one hand, yet hold
that Congress did not intend the Act to be enforced against the states in federal court. See
Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974 DUKE L.J.
925.
29. 411 U.S. at 284.
30. See Implied Waiver, supra note 28; Comment, The Elusive Eleventh Amendment
and the Perimeters of Federal Power, 46 COLO. L. REV. 211 (1974). The Court appears to
have made a distinction without a difference. The jurisdictional provisions in the FELA
grants concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state courts, 45 U.S.C. § 56(1970); the jurisdic-
tional provision of the FLSA reads in part, "Action to recover such liability may be
maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1970). The majority
opinion apparently grasped at the different wording to bolster its intent argument.
31. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
32. Id.
33. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (1973). The Court of Appeals said:
Since the State of Illinois obligated itself to follow federal law in disbursing welfare
assistance, it cannot cogently complain . . . having to make those payments now,
which federal law required it to make in the first place, . . . In accepting the federal
assistance program, the state must have calculated the cost . . ..
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in essentially a two-pronged argument. First, they held that the
recognition of implied waiver in Parden and Employees could not
be used to support Jordan's argument because the AABD program
lacked any Congressional authorization to sue for benefit claims.34
The majority opinion concluded:
The question of waiver or consent under the Eleventh Amend-
ment was found in those cases [Parden and Employees] to turn
on whether Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity in
question, and whether the State by its participation in the pro-
gram authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abro-
gation of that immunity.
But in this case the threshold fact of congressional authoriza-
tion to sue a class of defendants which literally includes States
is wholly absent.35
The Court also rejected two possible alternatives to the express
authorization to sue. First, the majority opinion summarily re-
jected the use of an individual suit, absent express authorization,
to effectuate a statutory purpose. While the Court agreed that such
suits were allowed in J.L Case v. Borak to effectuate the Securities
and Exchange Act, they concluded that their use in the area of the
Eleventh Amendment was inappropriate." In addition, the Court
rejected the use of section 1983 as a substitute for an express
authorization to sue. The Court said:
But it has not heretofore been suggested that § 1983 was intended
to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity
merely because an action could be brought under that section
against state officers, rather than against the State itself."
The second line of reasoning which the Court relied upon to
reject implied waiver also had its roots in Parden and Employees.
The majority opinion reiterated that mere participation in a pro-
gram which is connected with federal legislation is not of itself
sufficient to constitute an implied waiver. 38 In conjunction with
34. 415 U.S. at 672.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 673-74, citing J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). But see, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which an individual right of action was found
to exist by virtue of the Fourth Amendment.
37. 415 U.S. at 675-7.
38. Id. at 673. The majority opinion said:
The mere fact that a State participates in a program through which the Federal
Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system of public
aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be sued in the
federal courts.
1975]
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this line of reasoning, the Court concluded, quoting Great North-
ern Insurance Co. v. Read, that waiver could only be found where
there was a ". . . clear declaration of a state's intention to submit
• ..to other courts than those of its own creation . . .39
Edelman thus limits the concept of implied waiver even further
than the requirement of an express grant of jurisdiction implied in
Employees. Edelman requires that the federal legislation which
regulates state conduct contain an express authorization to sue a
class of defendants including states. Unless these conditions are
met, the Court will not find implied waiver of the Eleventh Amend-
ment where a state participates in a federally regulated area.
The majority opinion's analysis of implied waiver is unsatisfac-
tory. First, as pointed out by the dissenting opinion of Justice
Marshall, the nature of the program involved in Edelman differed
greatly from the FLSA or the FELA.40 Marshall reasoned that
since the joint federal-state AABD program was optional, a state's
decision to participate would constitute a conscious waiver of im-
munity." Marshall considered waiver in this case to be a quid pro
quo for federal assistance in operating the welfare program. The
Seventh Circuit had also reasoned that voluntary participation was
conditioned on the acceptance of federal standards. They justified
their position in the following words:
However, the spectre of a state, perhaps calculatingly, defying
federal law and thereby depriving welfare recipients of financial
assistance Congress thought it was giving them convinces us that
Congress fully meant to condition the grant of federal funds on
the state's being susceptible to a federal court suit to obtain
retrospective relief. 2
The majority opinion, in restricting the application of implied
waiver, allows just such a calculated deprivation to occur.
The Court's citation of Great Northern Insurance is also ques-
tionable.4 3 While the quotation from that case accurately repre-
sents the prevailing judicial view toward express waiver, it appears
out of place in the context of Edelman. In Great Northern
Insurance, the question before the Court was whether a state could
be sued in federal court to recover an alleged overcharge of state
39. Id.
40. Id. at 688 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 688-9.
42. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 995 (1973).
43. 415 U.S. at 673, citing Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
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taxes, under a state statute that provided for suits to recover such
amounts." This was a far different factual situation than in
Edelman where the issue was one of implied waiver.
The Court's rejection in Edelman of section 1983 as an authori-
zation to sue was also criticized in Marshall's dissent. Although he
recognized that the Social Security Act, of which AABD was a
part, contained no provision for a private cause of action, Marshall
felt that section 1983 clearly remedied this deficiency. 5 Not only
did Jordan's claim satisfy the language of 1983, but Marshall
pointed to Rosado v. Wyman for the proposition that section 1983
was the proper vehicle to seek enforcement of the Act even though
there was no authorization for individual suits." In striking down
a New York provision which conflicted with the Social Security
Act, the Court in Rosado had said:
We have considered and rejected the argument that a federal
court is without power to review state welfare provisions or pro-
hibit the use of federal funds by the States in view of the fact that
Congress had lodged in the Department of HEW the power to
cut off federal funds for noncompliance with statutory require-
ments. We are most reluctant to assume that Congress has closed
the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most
directly affected by the administration of its program.17
The holding in Edelman appears to have closed the door "to
those most directly affected" at least in regard to a monetary
recovery. The opinion partially frustrates the purpose of section
1983, and indicates a judicial attempt to cut down the number of
such actions by denying their use as an authorization to sue in the
context of implied waiver."
III. SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICERS
Another exception to the absolute language of the Eleventh
Amendment is found in a line of cases which established the right
of an individual to sue state officers in order to prevent the enforce-
ment of unconstitutional state laws. This exception developed his-
torically from judicial attempts to define the scope of the Amend-
ment.
44. Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
45. 415 U.S. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 690-1.
47. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970).
48. See generally, McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974).
1975]
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In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,49 Chief Justice Mar-
shall announced a rule which, "admits of no exception," that for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment the Court would look to the
party of record to determine if it had jurisdiction. Almost immedi-
ately this rule began to undergo redefinition as suits were brought
against state officers to circumvent the Amendment.5" In the case
of In re Ayers,5 the Court attempted to harmonize previous deci-
sions regarding the Eleventh Amendment. In Ayers, the Court
dismissed a contempt citation against the Attorney General of
Virginia who had violated a federal court injunction. The injunc-
tion would have prevented Ayers from instituting court proceed-
ings under a state law which was designed to facilitate the dishonor
of state bonds. The opinion distinguished Osborn on its facts, and
held that the "party of record doctrine" announced in that case
would not apply when the officer named as defendant was merely
a nominal party.52 More importantly, the opinion held that state
officers could not be sued to prevent the enforcement of unconsti-
tutional state laws.5 3
Although Ayers retained its vitality for some time, it too began
to undergo a reexamination.54 In Ex Parte Young,55 the Court was
faced with a case similar to Ayers. In Young, the Attorney General
of Minnesota had been enjoined by a federal court from enforcing
state rate regulations on common carriers. In violation of the in-
junction, Young took state court action against a railroad, and the
federal court cited him for contempt. Young argued that the fed-
eral court was without jurisdiction to enjoin him or find him in
contempt.56 On appeal, the Court disagreed with Young's conten-
tions, and announced what has become a major exception to the
scope of the Amendment. After finding the rate scheme to be an
unconstitutional deprivation of property,57 the Court said:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be
a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding
under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior au-
49. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251, 277 (1824).
50. See. e.g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 481 (1828); Davis v.
Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
51. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
52. Id. at 488.
53. Id. at 506-7.
54. See, e.g., Regan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
55. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id. at 148.
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thority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct."
The distinction, of course, between the state, and its officer who is
enforcing state law, is purely fictitious. Nevertheless, Young allows
suits against state officers for equitable relief from unconstitu-
tional state laws.
The fiction announced in Young is important in two respects.
First, by allowing suits against state officers, the decision brought
greater federal judicial scrutiny of state enactments. At the time
the decision was announced, it showed a marked disposition by the
Court to modify the Eleventh Amendment by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 The Court, however, has never since squarely faced
the issue of what effect the Fourteenth Amendment has on the
Eleventh. The closest the Court has come to a resolution of this
question is dicta in the case of Prout v. Starr,6" indicating that the
Eleventh Amendment should not be a bar to judicial determination
of whether state laws deprive citizens of their Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. The question was presented to the Court in Edelman
in an amicus brief, but the opinion failed to mention the issue."1 It
appears that until the question is directly presented to the Court,
the relationship between the two will ebb and flow with the prevail-
ing judicial attitudes.
The second feature of Young that merits examination is the
opinion's implication that only prospective equitable relief is pro-
per in a suit of this nature against a state officer. 2 It has long been
held that relief that must necessarily come from state coffers is
barred unless the state consents. 3 When the majority opinion
58. Id. at 159-60.
59. C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 142.
60. 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903). The Court said:
It would indeed be most unfortunate if the immunity of the individual States .
provided in the Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nullifying those other
provisions [of the Constitution] which confer power on Congress ... all of which
still exist, and which would be nullified ... if the judicial power of the United States
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage of State Laws
disregarding these Constitutional limitations. Much less can the Eleventh Amend-
ment be successfully pleaded as an invincible barrier to judicial inquiry whether the
salutary provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been disregarded by State
enactment.
61. 415 U.S. at 694, n. 2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. 209 U.S. at 163, 165.
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
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declined to find waiver, the key question in Edelman became
whether the retroactive award was equitable relief within the scope
of Young, or whether it was barred by the Amendment.
Certiorari was granted in Edelman64 to resolve the conflict be-
tween the Seventh Circuit's analysis of retroactive benefit pay-
ments, and a contrary result reached by the Second Circuit.65 In
Jordan, the Court of Appeals read Young broadly, and found the
retroactive award to be justified not only on grounds of fairness,
but also on the ability of an equity court to fashion an appropriate
remedy.66
The opposite result was reached in Rothstein v. Wyman,67 a
case which arose out of unequal distributions of AABD benefits in
New York. In that case, the Second Circuit found that retroactive
benefits were not appropriate relief," and in any event, would be
barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Although Rothstein had
been criticized, 70 the Court in Edelman adopted its narrower read-
ing of Young, excluding equitable restitution as a permissible rem-
edy.7'
While the majority opinion in Edelman recognized that pro-
spective injunctional relief, sanctioned by its reading of Young, had
an ancillary effect on state funds, 7 it rejected any direct attack on
state treasuries, regardless of how they are denominated. 73 For all
practical purposes, the Court said, equitable restitution was an
award of money damages. 74 The Court assumed that since these
payments would not come from Edelman, but the state, they were
barred by the Amendment. 7 That assumption, however, would not
so easily follow if the suit had been brought by an individual rather
than as a class action. 76
In rejecting the retroactive payments, the Court professed to
64. 415 U.S. at 658.
65. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (1972).
66. 472 F.2d at 994-5.
67. 467 F.2d 226 (1972).
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id. at 236.
70. See, McCormack, supra note 48, at 46-8.
71. 415 U.S. at 666.
72. Id. at 667-8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 668.
75. Id.
76. Apparently the size of the award of retroactive benefits to the class, coupled with
the fact that Edelman was not the original defendant, was the basis of the Court's assump-
tion.
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adhere to the rule of Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, which
held that awards which must necessarily come from the state are
barred." The opinion reasoned that Ford Motor Co. would have
to be overruled if the retroactive payments were upheld.71 In so
stating, the Court overlooked the fact that Ford Motor Co. was a
case involving state taxes, similar to Great Northern Insurance
Co.,79 and that the main issue in Ford Motor Co. was express
waiver."0 The Court could have more clearly made the distinction
between cases in which the Supreme Court has allowed recovery
against officers that effect state coffers, and those in which the
Amendment has been interposed as a bar. In the first line of cases,
recovery has been allowed where the state, through its officers, has
wrongfully withheld the plaintiffs property." In the second line of
cases, recovery has been denied where the action seeks specific
performance of contract obligations." Edelman would appear to
fall within the second category, making the reference to Ford
Motor Co. more confusing than illuminating.
In addition to clearly limiting Young to prospective injunc-
tional relief, Edelman accomplished two other results. First, it
explicitly overruled four cases in which retroactive benefits were
ordered.8 Because three of these were summary affirmances, and
the fourth did not discuss the Eleventh Amendment, the majority
opinion did not feel restricted by stare decisis.8 4 The second ancil-
lary effect of the decision was to limit the usefulness of section
1983. Although the section allows both equitable and legal relief,
the decision in Edelman limits suits against officers carrying out
state policy to prospective injunctional relief for a deprivation of
constitutional rights.
77. 415 U.S. at 665.
78. Id. at 668.
79. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
80. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
81. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 251 (1824);
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885); c.f. U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
82. See, e.g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 480 (1828); Louisiana
v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883); c.f. Larsen v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682 (1949).
83. State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972);
Sterrett v. Mothers' and Children's Rights Organization, 409 U.S. 809 (1972); Wyman v.
Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
84. 415 U.S. at 671. Only Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), was considered
in detail by the Court. It is interesting to note the Seventh Circuit took just the opposite
approach; they initially considered the retroactive benefit issue foreclosed on stare decisis
grounds. 472 F.2d at 989.
1975]
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IV. EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY
As the foregoing analysis indicates, suits against a state officer
in his official capacity may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment
unless they fit into the Young exception for prospective injunc-
tional relief. Since the Amendment is a bar to recovering money
damages from officers when the award must necessarily come from
the state treasury, the only avenue open for the plaintiff seeking
compensatory damages is to sue the policy making official under
section 1983. In Scheuer the Court recognized a partial barrier to
such suits.5
After a brief discussion of the history and function of sovereign
immunity, the Court announced for section 1983 purposes:
* . [A] qualified immunity is available to officers of the execu-
tive branch of government, the variation dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based."6
The opinion relied upon the Court's earlier decisions in Tenney v.
Bradhove,s7 and Pierson v. Ray,"8 which recognized absolute im-
munity from section 1983 actions for legislators and judges acting
within the scope of their offices. In excluding legislators from the
reach of section 1983, the opinion in Tenney traced the history of
English immunity for members of Parliament. The opinion noted
that the English immunity for statements made in Parliament had
been carried over to the United States and codified in the speech
and debate clause of the Constitution, and incorporated into the
constitutions of most of the states. 9 The Court assumed that Con-
gress, itself a legislative body, did not intend to abrogate this long
standing immunity in creating section 1983.90
In Pierson, the Court held that an equally well established
immunity for members of the judiciary extended to civil rights
legislation as well. The Court said that it could find no evidence
that Congress intended to "abolish wholsesale all common law
immunities" with the passage of the civil rights legislations."
85. 416 U.S. at 247-8.
86. 416 U.S. at 247.
87. Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
88. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
89. 341 U.S. at 372-75. See also, Comment, Brewster, Gravel and Legislative
Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973).
90. See, 341 U.S. at 376.
91. 386 U.S. at 554.
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While the English history of judicial and legislative immunity
is long and rather clear, the origins and extent of executive immun-
ity do not enjoy such an established tradition.92 As Chief Justice
Warren noted in his dissent in Barr v. Matteo, an executive privi-
lege for libelous statements is less than 100 years old. 3 Indeed,
while the entire nature of sovereign immunity may be traced to the
English notion that "the King can do no wrong," in England at
least this did not mean that the King's officers shared the same
privilege. There existed in England recognized remedies against the
abuses of the King's officers, but these never became part of Amer-
ican common law.94
The Scheuer opinion also placed great reliance upon the need
for state executives to make rapid decisions based on limited infor-
mation when compelled by circumstances to do so." Drawing an
analogy from the "good faith-probable cause" immunity that
police have to section 1983, the Court said:
In common with police officers, however, officials with a broad
range of duties and authority must often act swiftly and firmly
at the risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual
abdication of office.96
Against the need for decisive executive action the Court pur-
ported to balance the purpose of section 1983. Quoting Sterling v.
Constantin, the Court held that the actions of state officers could
not take on the quality of "a supreme and unchangeable edict,"
and that official excesses were the subject of judicial review.9 7 The
result of this balancing is the Court's statement of a qualified
immunity:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-
92. See generally, McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment, 51 NC. L. REv. 485 (1973); C. JACOBS, supra note 1, ch. 6.
93. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 582 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
94. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 18-19 (1963).
95. 416 U.S. at 241-2. The Court said:
Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislators or judges, who fail
to make decisions when they are needed or who do not act to implement decisions
when they are made do not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices
.... The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better
to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at
all.
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 248-9, quoting from Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-8 (1932).
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faith belief, that affords the basis for qualified immunity of exec-
utive officers for acts performed in the course of official con-
duct.9"
The Supreme Court's treatment of sovereign immunity,
whether involving state or federal officers, has often been inconsist-
ent." Cases dealing with sovereign immunity have generally fallen
into four groups.10 One category includes, "cases in which a plain-
tiff suffers legal detriment through action of an officer who has
exceeded his statutory authority." 10t It is into this group that
Scheuer would fit. The allegations of the compliant were that the
Governor "intentionally, willfully and wantonly" caused an unnec-
essary deployment of the Guard which resulted in the deaths of the
plaintiff's decedents.102 The fact that he did so pursuant to statutory
authority and in his capacity as a state officer made his actions
under the "color of state law." ' 3 It is this situation that section
1983 was designed to rectify: the alleged abuse of state power to
deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights. As Justice Douglas
noted in his dissent in Pierson, Congress enacted the section with
the words "every person" in spite of the fears of some members
that the wording would subject members of the judiciary [and by
implication, other state officers] to liability.104 Even a qualified
98. Id. at 247-8.
99. See, Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter wrote:
The course of decisions concerning sovereign immunity is a good illustration of
the conflicting considerations that often struggle for mastery in the judicial process
. In varying degrees, at different times, the momentum of the historic doctrine
is arrested or deflected by an unexpressed feeling that governmental immunity runs
counter to the prevailing notions of reason and justice.
100. Id. at 709-10. Justice Frankfurter classified the cases as follows:
(I) Cases in which the plaintiff seeks an interest in property which concededly,
even under the allegation of the complaint, belongs to the government, or calls for
an assertion of what is unquestionably official authority.
(2) Cases in which action to the legal detriment of a plaintiff is taken by an
official justifying his action under an unconstitutional statute.
(3) Cases in which a plaintiff suffers a legal detriment through action of an
officer who has exceeded his statutory authority.
(4) Cases in which an officer seeks shelter behind statutory authority or some
other sovereign command for the commission of a common-law tort.
Frankfurter's dissent also contains a lengthy appendix which purports to list all the
sovereign immunity cases under these categories from Osborn to Larson. See also, McCor-
mack, supra note 48, at 36-7.
101. 337 U.S. at 710.
102. 416 U.S. at 235.
103. See, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
104. 386 U.S. at 561-63 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
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immunity defeats the historical purpose and the explicit wording
of the section.
It has been suggested that Scheuer has fashioned an immunity
to section 1983 similar to the "discretionary function" exception
found in the Federal Tort Claims Act," 5 but since the case was
decided at the pleading stage, the nature of the immunity has
been left to subsequent cases. An indication of the scope of the im-i
munity, however, can be found in the recent decision of Wood v.
Strickland.'° In Wood, two high school students were expelled
from school after they admitted "spiking the punch" at a school
related function. The students brought suit against the principal of
the school, and the members of the local school board, under
section 1983. The district court directed a verdict for the defen-
dants. '7 The court of appeals reversed, finding that the students
had been denied "substantive due process."'0 8 The Court vacated
and remanded the case in an opinion that dealt largely with the
board's claim of immunity.0 9
In extending the qualified immunity from section 1983 to
school board members, the Court relied primarily on Scheuer,
Pierson, Tennery, and "strong public policy reasons.""' 0 First, the
Court stressed the need for board members to make the same type
of discretionary judgments that it found essential for state officers
to make.' Notwithstanding the fact that the case in Wood arose
out of an expulsion, voted upon at a regular board meeting, the
opinion likened the board's discipline action to a state executive
threatened with immediate civil disorder."2
The Court next addressed itself to the policy reasons for ex-
tending immunity. The opinion was concerned that it would be
unfair for board members to be subject to damage awards for
actions made in good faith. The opinion feared that such a result
105. Aiken, Tort Liability of Governing Boards, Administrators, and Faculty in Higher
Education, 2 THE JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 129, 138 (1975). The
"discretionary function" exception is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). An infamous
example of its application is found in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
106. Wood v. Strickland, - U.S. 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975).
107. 348 F.Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
108. 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973).
109. - U.S. - 95 S.Ct. 992 (1975).
110. Id. at , 95 S.Ct. at 998-9. The Court acknowledged that prior to Wood there
had been a split of authority over immunity for school board members. See also, Comment,
Smith v. Losee: Official Immunity of School Board Members Under Section 1983, 1973
UTAH L. REV. 820, 822-5.
111. - U.S. at - 95 S.Ct. at 999.
112. Id. at - 95 S.Ct. at 999.
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would discourage capable citizens from seeking office."' It was
this combination of Scheuer principles and public policy which
persuaded the Court to extend the qualified immunity to the board
members for their good faith attempts to fulfill their positions.
More important to the issue of immunity was the Court's dis-
cussion of what constituted "good faith." The Court said:
The disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the Dis-
trict Court over the immunity standard in this case has been put
in terms of an "objective" versus a "subjective" test of good
faith. As we see it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains
elements of both. The official must himself be acting sincerely
and with the belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a
student's constitutional rights can no more be justified by igno-
rance or disregard of settled, indisputable law . . . than by the
presence of actual malice."'
Although the Court notes that the definitions of good faith are not
mutually exclusive, the apparent equation of ignorance of the law
with actual malice raises a question for those who seek to claim
the immunity." 5 While the majority opinion maintains that board
members need not predict the future course of constitutional law,
it also suggests that the penalty for failure to keep up with the law
will be an award of compensatory damages to the plaintiff."'
Moreover, officials who are subject to section 1983 are faced with
potential liability for harm that is reasonably foreseeable as a
result of a constitutional deprivation."7 Thus even those members
of a school board who qualify for the immunity may be held liable
under section 1983 for the malicious deprivation of a student's
rights, or for their failure to foresee, in light of existing law, that
their actions would cause such a deprivation.
Wood thus begins what may well be a long line of cases setting
the boundaries of the qualified immunity announced in Scheuer.
The case indicates that one need not be a full time state official to
avail himself of the immunity, rather the focus is on discretionary
decision making as a prerequisite to it.
113. Id. at. . 95 S.Ct. at 999-1000.
114. Id. at 95 S.Ct. at 1000.
115. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist dissented in
part over this issue. It was their belief that the restatement of immunity by the majority
opinion actually imposed a heavier standard than was announced in Scheuer. - U.S. at
95 S.Ct. at 1005.
116. Id. at , 95 S.Ct. at 1001.
117. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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V. CONCLUSION
The language of the Eleventh Amendment has been subjected
to two major judicial exceptions: waiver, and the rule of Ex Parte
Young.1 8 In deciding the cases of Edelman v. Jordan,"'9 and
Scheuer v. Rhodes,"' the Supreme Court has combined the Elev-
enth Amendment with the doctrine of executive immunity to re-
strict the reach of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
Edelman indicates that implied waiver of a state's Eleventh
Amendment protection will be difficult for plaintiffs to establish.
The case also clearly indicates that equitable relief, in a suit against
a state officer, must be prospective only, or it will be barred by the
Amendment. In limiting the doctrine of implied waiver, the Court
has made federal forums unavailable to plaintiffs who have been
subjected to deprivations of their constitutional rights by state
officers. Such a limitation allows the possibility of intentional vio-
lations of federal standards by states in areas subject to federal
regulation. Absent implied waiver, individual plaintiffs are fore-
closed from anything except prospective injunctional relief when
they sue state officers acting in a ministerial capacity.
Scheuer, in turn, interposes a qualified good faith immunity
between the plaintiff and the only remaining source of money dam-
ages in cases where the deprivation is caused by a state officer -
the policy making official. As the official's discretionary responsi-
bilities increase, so does the immunity. Apparently, only such will-
ful deprivations that evidence bad faith are compensable. Thus the
plaintiff seeking money damages from state officers is caught be-
tween the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity.
Wood v. Strickland,"' indicates that the qualified immunity
announced in Scheuer is applicable even to those who engage in
limited public duties, as long as they have discretionary responsi-
bilities. Wood demonstrates the Court's propensity to extend the
immunity as long as the person seeking its protection does not
stray out of the area of "good faith."
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